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The current federal marketing order contains perfectly competitive market may have ocprovisions for producer allotments, shipping curred. However, the bulk of statistical holidays, and prorate periods. evidence suggests that the departure from Using a weekly simultaneous equations marginal cost pricing implied by the model, Shonkwiler and Pagoulatos analyzed industry's pricing behavior is not statistically pricing in the Florida celery industry. Based significant.
on the similarity of the restricted and unrestricted reduced form equations and the Key words: celery, market orders, oligopoly fact that the estimated own price elasticity of power, price enhancement.
demand was inelastic, they concluded that the pricing behavior of the industry was consistThe Secretary of Agriculture is charged ent with that of a competitive market. Updaw, with ensuring that market orders do not in a comment on their article, was critical of result in undue price enhancement. A price is the analysis on the grounds that the demand generally considered acceptable if it allows model was misspecified and that the use of firms to cover costs and realize a reasonable weekly data essentially biased the model profit sufficient to keep firms in the industry, toward obtaining inelastic point estimates of Any price that exceeds this definition may be the own price elasticity of demand. To support considered as unduly enhanced. Thus, "prohis contention, Updaw pointed out that the ducers should not be allowed to raise prices own price elasticity increases as the length of too fast or to achieve excess profits" adjustment increases and suggested that (Polopolus et al., p. 13) .
generally "the demand for Florida celery One provision of market orders that has the would have been estimated to be elastic at potential to lead to undue price enhancement observed prices and quantities if quarterly or is that which allows for quantity or volume annual observations had been used." control through volume management and An additional criticism of Shonkwiler and market flow regulations (Jesse and Johnson, Pagoulatos' study is that it entirely ignored p. 4). Volume management consists of such cost of production. Thus, issues involving how provisions as producer allotments, market prices compared to estimated marginal cost allocation, and reserve pools. Market flow were ignored. This however is not surprising regulations consist of handler prorates and as cost data are only available on an annual shipping holidays. These provisions allow probasis and their use in conjunction with weekly ducers through a market order to adjust the price and quantity data would make quantity marketed. Quantity control proviestablishing the existence of marginal cost pricing difficult.
(2) max [pyj -ci(yj,w) 
The purpose of this paper is to provide an alternative analysis of pricing behavior in the d t c f Florida celery industry, using annual data and jth firm and y = yJ incorporating cost data into the model so that the pricing behavior of the industry may be J the pricing behavior of the industry may be
The cost functions for all firms are assumed to judged in relation to marginal costs. By using udged i relation to marginal costs. By usg be twice differentiable and well defined in the annual data, it is hoped that some light may be sense of satisfying the requisite theoretical sense of satisfying the requisite theoretical shed on the objections raised by Updaw conregularity conditions. 2 It should be noted that cerning the magnitude of the own price the profit maximization problem in (2) essenelasticity of demand. Furthermore, by incortially represents the second of two optimizaporating cost of production into the model, intion stages since the decision variable in (2) where JO denotes the conjectural elasticity 3 of firms, each producing a homogeneous product, the jth firm: y, with input vector x = (x,. .. ,xn). Further, assume that firms operating in the industry (5) iJ = (ay/lyJXy/ly), are price takers in input markets with input price vector w = (wi,...,wn) and face the inand ' is the negative of the inverse price dustry demand curve elasticity of demand given by
where p is output price, z denotes a vector of
The relationship in equation (4) basically exogenous demand shift variables, and ay/ap states that the optimal output decisions of < 0. Given the existence of a well-defined firms occur at the point where perceived technology, the profit maximization problem marginal revenue is equated to marginal cost. for the jth firm may be written as It may be noted that the perceived marginal 'This section is basically a summary of the theoretical model presented in Appelbaum.
2In the present analysis, a well-defined cost function is assumed to be non-negative, continuous in w and y, homogeneous of degree one in w, non-decreasing in w and y, and concave in w.
revenue of the jth firm is dependent on both Appelbaum solves this problem by assuming the conjectural elasticity and the inverse price that, in equilibrium, all firms possess the same elasticity of demand. Indeed, it is the marginal cost and hence have the same dependency of this relationship on the conjecperceived marginal revenue. However, an imtural elasticity that ties equation (4) to market plication of all firms having the same perstructure. More specifically, i provides a ceived marginal revenue is that all firms have rough index of market structure. For examthe same equilibrium conjectural elasticity pie, under perfect competition, 8i = 0 and (see equation [4] ). marginal cost pricing results, while under Defining c(y,w) to be the aggregate industry pure monopoly, Oi = 1. It can be seen from cost function, the aggregate "optimality" conthese two polar cases that 8J is bounded by dition for the industry thus becomes zero and one.
In addition to using JO as a measure of (9) p(l -8t) = ac(y,w)/ay, market structure, Appelbaum (p. 290) also defines an index of the degree of oligopoly where 0 represents the equilibrium conjecpower exhibited by the jth firm as tural elasticity common to all firms. The implied aggregate oligopoly power index then (7) oj = 8Ji.
Referring back to equation (4), it can be seen EMPIRICAL MODEL AND RESULTS that the oligopoly power index in (7) is essenEmpirical implementation of the Aptially the Lerner index (Waterson p. 19) , [ppelbaum model requires specification of an agacJ(yi,w)/ayi]/p, for the jth firm. Although this gregate cost function and a market demand index is firm specific, Appelbaum (p. 290) function. The cost function for the Florida develops an industry level generalization of (7) celery industry is expressed in terms of the to obtain the industry measure of oligopoly aggregate inputs, labor (xl), capital (xk), and power intermediate materials (xm), with respective input prices wl, wk, and wm. Output is (8) L = ?CjSj, measured by total Florida celery production j and is denoted by yf. A complete discussion of the data is presented in the appendix. where Sj denotes the share of industry output
The parametric form of the aggregate cost attributable to the jth firm. This index can be function is given by the quasi-homothetic 4 seen to be the weighted sum of each firm's form of the Generalized Leontief function output share times each firm's oligopoly (Diewert, 1971 ) power index.
In principle, equations (1), (3), and (4) con-(10) c = [ai (Wi wj)2]y + c i i,j = stitute a system of (nonlinear) equations that ij i can be estimated. By specifying Oi to be a func-,k tion of the exogenous variables, estimates of the conjectural elasticities and oligopoly where ai = aji. Quasi-homotheticity embodies power index which vary over time may be obthe least restrictive assumption that can be tained. However, as noted by Appelbaum, the maintained on the underlying production time series cross section data on individual technologies of individual firms to establish firms necessary to accomplish estimation are the existence of an aggregate cost function. In seldom available. Hence an aggregate forcontrast to the usual assumption of mulation of the model is required for most emhomotheticity wherein all firms have identical pirical applications, and linear expansion paths emanating from In general, the aggregate formulation of the the origin, quasi-homotheticity maintains the cost function (and hence input demands) and assumption that the expansion paths of inmarket demand function is straightforward. dividual firms are linear and parallel, but Where potential difficulties arise is in specifyallows them to differ across firms. Since this ing an aggregate measure of the conjectural implies all firms have equal marginal costs, agelasticity. gregation across firms is possible.
As the analysis is conducted at the grower ln(yf) = b + bfln(pf/e) + bcln(pc/e) + level, the relevant industry demand function is wholesale (shipping point) demand for bdln(pd/e), and Florida celery. The parametric form of the depf = [allW + akkwk + ammwm mand function is specified to be + 2alk(wlwk) 1 / 2 + (11) ln(yf) = b + bfln(pf/e) + bcln(pc/e) 2alm(wlwm)/2 + + bdln(pd/e), + bdln(~p~d/e), 2akm(wkwm)/2]/(1 + where yf is the wholesale demand for Florida 0(w)/bf). celery measured as total Florida celery production, pf and Pc denote the FOB price of Lagged dependent variables, xj, -1, j=l, k, Florida and California celery respectively, Pd m, were included in the input demand equarepresents the price of diesel fuel, and e is tions to allow for sluggish adjustment of these total wholesale expenditures on Florida and factors to equilibrium levels. As noted by Lau, California celery. The price of California this is tantamount to assuming that the adcelery is included in the demand equation justment path of each input is characterized since California is the main competitor with by a partial adjustment process and that the Florida in the U.S. celery market. The inclurate of adjustment of each input is indepension of the price of diesel fuel in equation (11) dent of that of the other inputs. is to provide a proxy measure for the cost of To allow the conjectural elasticity to vary transporting celery to wholesalers. The choice over time, 0 in the above equation system is of total expenditures on Florida and California approximated by the linear function 5 celery at the shipping point rather than some measure of consumer income in equation (11) (13) (w) = g + glwl + gkwk + gmm . reflects the fact that this equation represents the derived demand for celery at the This specification merits additional discussion. wholesale level rather than retail demand for It may be recalled that 0 is the elasticity form Florida celery. It may be noted that deflation of the conjectural variation, which measures of prices by expenditures in equation (11) imthe aggregate output response of rival firms plicitly imposes homogeneity of degree zero in when any one firm alters its output. Furtherprices and expenditure. more, it has been shown that in equilibrium Given these specifications for the aggregate the conjectural elasticity of all firms will be cost function and wholesale demand, the comequal. Given that all firms face the same deplete system to be estimated with cross price mand curve (i.e., same own price elasticity of symmetry imposed is given by demand), it is reasonable to assume that the output responses of rival firms to an output change by any one firm will be influenced by x1 = [all + alk(wk/wl)/ 2 + their (marginal) cost functions which are in al (w /w )/2]y + c4 + turn dependent on input prices. Thus, exalm(Wm/wl)] + c 1 + pressing 0 in terms of input prices should adebxXl,-1 , quately account for changes in the equilibrium value of the conjectural elasticity. magnitude and not statistically different from In any use of dual functions, a primary conzero, global concavity of the cost function, at cern is whether or not the estimated equaleast in a "statistical" sense, is not disproved. tions are consistent with the regularity condiOne empirical result of note is the fact that tions implied by theory. In the estimated the estimated own price elasticity of demand, model, both symmetry and homogeneity of bf, is -0.42 and is statistically significant. degree one in input prices are maintained a
Thus, it appears Updaw was incorrect in surpriori. Hence, only the properties of mising that the own price elasticity of demand monotonicity and concavity must be evalwould be greater than one if annual as opuated.
posed to weekly data were used. Monotonicity may be evaluated by inspect-
The estimated conjectural elasticities and ing the predicted values generated from the oligopoly power index along with their respecestimated input demand functions. If all tive standard errors 6 are presented in Table 2 . predicted values are non-negative, monoThe point estimates for conjectural elasticities tonicity will be satisfied over the closed set and oligopoly power index indicate some defined by the data. Inspection of the degree of price enhancement above that which 6 Standard errors for the conjectural elasticities and oligopoly power index were calculated using a second order Taylor series as an approximation to the true standard errors. would be observed in a perfectly competitive increasing its share of the celery market. market wherein price is equated to marginal Thus, it is possible that the increased competicost. This is especially evident during the intion from producers in California has served itial years of the analysis where the oligopoly to increasingly limit the ability of the Florida power index is in excess of 0.30. Both the conindustry to increase prices above marginal jectural elasticities and oligopoly power index, cost.
however, exhibit a downward trend over timwever, ehibits i s that the d re of prie Although the point estimates of the oligoptime. This implies that the degree of price enhancement as measured by point estimates oly power index indicate that some degree of enhancement as measured by point estimates price enhancement has been observed, the of the oligopoly power index has declined price enhancement has been observed, the somewhat over the period of analysis.
question of whether or not the degree of price somewhat over the period of analysis.
It is difficult to precisely interpret the enhancement implied by the conjectural elasticities and oligopoly power index downward trend in the oligopoly power index. els es ad olig ly i However, two plausible explanations can be represents a statistically significant departure However, two plausible explanations can be from the prices that would be obtained from offered. First, it is possible that the industry from the pric t w obtained from in the initial years of the market order tended erf competitive pricing has not been established. This is somewhat difficult to to enhance prices to a larger degree than was etalie is sat diffi evaluate in a precise statistical manner. necessary as part of a learning process. Over l s
at
Although the hypothesis that g = gl = gk time, however, as the ability to gauge the Altho hthe thesithat market improved, the degree of price m = 0 is nested within the model and can therefore be tested using conventional enhancement that was deemed appropriate therefore be tested using conventional denhncement tt ws deemed statistical procedures, this hypothesis represents only a sufficient condition for 0 = A second explanation for this downward 0. A rejection of this hypothesis does not trend relates to the fact that California, as preclude 0 = 0, since 0 is not specified to be noted by Shonkwiler and Pagoulatos, has been constant but rather a function of the ex-
reviewer, what exactly constitutes excessive The parameter estimates and asymptotic price enhancement under a federal marketing standard errors for the restricted model are order is a normative question. What the model presented in the last two columns of Table 1. can provide, however, is evidence on whether It may be noted that, as was the case with the or not the pricing behavior of a given industry unrestricted model, the estimated model is represents a statistically significant departure not inconsistent with the requisite theoretical from that which would be found in a perfectly regularity conditions. Using the testing procompetitive market. cedure suggested by Gallant and Jorgenson, The weight of empirical evidence obtained the hypothesis that g = gl gk = gm = 0 in this study suggests that the Florida celery yields a test statistic of T o = 17.1816. The industry has not enhanced price above a level critical value of the x 2 distribution at the c = that would be consistent with a perfectly com-0.01 level of significance with 4 degrees of petitive market. A test of the hypothesis that freedom is 13.3. Thus, the hypothesis that g = g gl= gk = gm = 0 was rejected. However, 1g = gk = gm = 0 is rejected.
this test only evaluated a sufficient condition As noted, however, a rejection of this for 0 = 0. Hence, its rejection cannot be conhypothesis alone does not provide sufficient sidered as sufficient evidence to conclude a information to conclude the absence of departure from marginal cost pricing. Local marginal cost pricing. Appelbaum suggested "tests" conducted by comparing the that an alternative, and perhaps more inforestimated conjectural elasticities and oligopmative, means to judge the empirical results oly power indexes to their respective stanis to compare the estimated conjectural dard errors indicated a lack of statistical sigelasticities and oligopoly power indexes with nificance at every observation and at the their respective standard errors and locally mean values of the input prices. Thus, it may evaluate their significance (p. 296).
be concluded that the pricing behavior of the Examining Table 2 , it is apparent that the Florida celery industry does not represent a estimated conjectural elasticities and oligopstatistically significant departure from that oly power indexes are not statistically signifiwhich would be characterized by a perfectly cant at conventional significance levels at any competitive market. These results are consisobservation. Similar results hold for the content with those found by Shonkwiler and jectural elasticity and oligopoly power index Pagoulatos using a simultaneous equation evaluated at the mean of the sample. Thus, on model based on weekly data. the basis of these "tests" it appears that no It may also be noted that the data contain departure from the marginal cost pricing rule only actual costs of production and have not that would typify a perfectly competitive been adjusted to include opportunity cost or, market can be concluded for the Florida equivalently, some measure of normal profit. celery industry.
Inclusion of such data would likely result in a decrease in the point estimates of the oligop-SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS oly power index. This would further support the contention that the empirical results sugThe purpose of this analysis was to assess gest that the pricing behavior of the Florida the pricing behavior of the Florida celery incelery industry has not represented a signifidustry under the current federal marketing cant departure from marginal cost pricing. order. In order to accomplish this, the market Another interesting empirical result relates structure as measured by the conjectural to the own price elasticity of demand which elasticity and an index of oligopoly power imwas estimated to be -0.42 and was statistiplied by the pricing behavior of the industry cally significant. This result appears to refute was estimated using the model proposed by Updaw's contention that the elasticity of deAppelbaum. This model is well suited to the mand would be greater than one if a model evaluation of pricing behavior under market based on annual data as opposed to weekly orders as it provides a direct means to assess data were used. the degree to which prices have or have not Finally, it should be noted that the results of been enhanced above those that would result this analysis, as in any application of dual from perfectly competitive pricing. Of course, theory, are conditioned by the need for the what constitutes excessive price enhancement cost function to satisfy empirically the reqcannot be addressed by the model. However, uisite regularity conditions. In the present as correctly pointed out by an anonymous analysis, the cost function was shown to satisfy monotonicity at every data point. A negatively sloped at every data point, insufficient condition for global concavity of the dicating that a necessary condition for concost function could not be rejected in a cavity was indeed satisfied. Symmetry and "statistical" sense. In this vein, it should be homogeneity of degree one in input prices noted that the input demand functions were were maintained a priori.
